Assessing social care policy through a behavioural lens by Oliver, Adam
Assessing social care policy through a behavioural lens
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100198/
Version: Published Version
Article:
Oliver, Adam (2019) Assessing social care policy through a behavioural lens. 
Mind and Society, 17 (1-2). pp. 39-51. ISSN 1593-7879 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-019-00202-7
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) 
licence. This licence allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even 
commercially, as long as you credit the authors for the original work. More information 
and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
Vol.:(0123456789)
Mind & Society
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-019-00202-7
1 
Assessing social care policy through a behavioural lens
Adam Oliver
1
 
© The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
Over recent years, a number of behavioural economic-informed policy frameworks 
have been developed, ranging from soft and hard forms of paternalism, to regula-
tion against negative externalities, the so-called nudge, shove and budge approaches. 
This article considers these different frameworks as applied to some of the chal-
lenges posed by the social care needs of contemporary societies. It is argued that 
all of the frameworks are worthy of serious consideration in this policy domain, in 
that they offer food for thought on how financial contributions to pay for social care 
might be increased, and how the quality of social care provision may be improved 
given available resources.
Keywords Behavioural economics · Budge · Nudge · Paternalism · Shove · Social 
care
1 Introduction
There is a view held by many that social care, like health care, is a special good, 
the financing and consumption of which ought not to be left entirely to users them-
selves. If left entirely to the private sphere, social care will be inequitably distrib-
uted due to unaffordability and myopia, and yet its appropriate provision is perhaps 
crucial to the human experience. If delivered well, it can offer mobility, compassion 
and dignity to the relatively infirm, both young and old. If attempting to offer dignity 
to all people who have social care needs is not in some sense special, then we can 
leave social care to those who have the assets to pay for it. Those who cannot afford 
it would then have to rely on their families, friends or charity to help them, to an 
even greater extent than they do now. However, assuming that most of us believe 
that social care is a special good, then, ideally, a public or private insurance system 
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needs to underpin it, preferably one in which people who are both good and bad 
risks are willing and able to participate so that premiums are affordable for all.
However, in England the state does not provide financial support for universal 
social care, and private social care insurance does not exist. There are a number of 
reasons why insurance companies have not entered this sector: for instance, there is 
great uncertainty over how long people will live in the future, as well as over chang-
ing care and support needs and costs. Lack of supply is not the only issue; there is 
also a lack of demand for social care insurance, again for multiple possible reasons. 
For example, there is a general lack of understanding of how the social care system 
works in England, with many perhaps overestimating the extent to which care is 
publicly financed and provided when needed. People might often also be reluctant to 
address an issue, such as infirmity when older, that is unpleasant to think about, and 
some will prefer to take a risk than to save to pay to cover a distant and unpredict-
able, if potentially high, cost.
The challenges facing the present and future financing and provision of social 
care in England and elsewhere are therefore substantial and are expected to be com-
pounded over time by further pressures on social care from an aging population. 
It appears likely that more care and support will have to be provided in the future, 
whether from increased public spending, private contributions and/or unpaid care. 
Key issues, then, are how policy may be designed to counter what many believe to 
be profound aspects of human irrationality that cause insufficient financial planning 
for future needs, and to motivate the best possible provision of care from available 
resources.
This article will endeavour to offer some food for thought on how behavioural 
economics might be used as an input into the social care policy discourse. My task is 
to outline some of the behavioural economic phenomena that might be most relevant 
to policy makers and practitioners in this area, to describe various policy approaches 
that are informed by behavioural economic findings, and to relate some broad social 
care policy interventions to these approaches.
2  Some relevant behavioural economic phenomena
The behavioural economic phenomena introduced here will be familiar to many 
readers, but for those new to the topic a brief description may prove helpful. For the 
purposes of this article it is sufficient to state that behavioural economics is the study 
of how people make decisions, and to consider a selection of the different ways that 
people systematically deviate from the assumptions of standard economic theory. 
These deviations can be viewed as a box of tools for policy makers to use on a case 
by case basis to attempt to improve the effectiveness of their policy interventions.
Present bias is the observation that people place a heavy weight on the imme-
diate moment, and quickly and greatly discount all future moments. Discounting, 
even the particular discounting, sometimes called hyperbolic discounting, implied 
by present bias, is allowed by standard economic theory, but in general exponential 
discounting with a fixed rate of, say, 3% or 5% is used in economic evaluations. Pre-
sent bias can, however, lead to cases of dynamic inconsistency, a form of preference 
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reversal, which makes it difficult to predict what people prefer in the future on the 
basis of their stated preferences now. For instance, a person may state in the present 
moment that they prefer to receive £50 4 weeks from now over £45 3 weeks from 
now, but when 3 weeks have elapsed the heavy emphasis on the immediate moment 
might lead them to prefer to take the £45 rather than wait the additional week for the 
extra £5. The immediate moment looms large and heavily affects decisions, which 
is at least a partial explanation for why people smoke, drink too much, eat too many 
sweets, take drugs, refrain from exercise and recycling, and save insufficiently for 
their retirements and potential social care needs.
In standard economic theory it is assumed that the holders of value are final 
assets—what you end up with is what counts. Behavioural economists, particu-
larly Kahneman and Tversky in their formulations of prospect theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992), have purported to show that the 
holders of value are often not final assets, but are rather gains and losses around 
some specific reference point, and that losses matter more than gains, a phenom-
enon known as loss aversion. Moreover, in prospect theory it is assumed that people 
are decreasingly sensitive to mounting gains and losses. Emphasising the threat of 
losses might therefore be a powerful motivator of behaviour change. Importantly, 
there is no scientific theory on what the reference point will be; it is not necessarily 
fixed, and is often likely to be the outcome that appears most salient. It can there-
fore be created and manipulated. Hypothetically, if, for instance, it was widely and 
aggressively publicised that the average adult saved, say, £10 per week in a fund 
for possible social care costs, then this figure might become the collective reference 
point. Consequently, those saving less than £10 per week towards this potential need 
might begin to consider their savings inadequate (i.e. a loss, in some sense), and 
may thus be particularly motivated to correct their behaviour.
Probability transformation is the observation that people tend to overweight small 
probabilities and underweight large probabilities, in contrast to the standard eco-
nomic assumption that people will process mathematical probabilities as given. Loss 
aversion and probability transformation are the two main modifications that pros-
pect theory makes to the standard economic model. The combination of the decreas-
ing sensitivities to mounting gains and losses around the reference point and the 
overweighting of small probabilities results in prospect theory predicting a distinct 
four-way pattern of individual risk attitudes: namely, that people will be risk averse 
when faced with small probabilities of losses and large probabilities of gains, and 
risk seeking when faced with small probabilities of gains and large probabilities of 
losses. Therefore, prospect theory predicts differing risk attitudes within a single 
individual, a common observation in life that standard economic theory has always 
struggled to explain. This preeminent theory of behavioural economics predicts that 
people would be willing to insure themselves against the quite low probability of 
requiring future social care support, although in the social care context where out-
comes are temporally distant, other behavioural economic phenomena, in particular 
present bias, appears to counteract this expectation.
There are common conceptions that standard models of rational choice theory 
assume that each individual is motivated by selfish utility maximisation, but there 
is longstanding work in behavioural economics that appears to show that other 
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motivational factors temper this model of selfishness. This is most famously demon-
strated by the ultimatum game (e.g. Guth et al. 1982), where some form of reciproc-
ity heuristic that motivates many of us to reward kindness and punish unkindness, at 
a cost to ourselves, often drives our decisions.
The final modification of standard economic theory considered here is associated 
with the work of Akerlof and Kranton (2010), who propose that people experience 
positive utility from working for or being associated with an organisation or a set 
of institutions with which they identify, and negative utility if they perceive them-
selves to be outsiders. According to Akerlof and Kranton, our identity defines who 
we are and will influence our behaviours, because different behavioural norms are 
associated with different identities. If we take social care providers, or local authori-
ties that are attempting to better incentivise providers, for example, good manag-
ers, according to the theory of identity utility, will want workers to be motivated 
insiders who identify with the goals of the organisation or system, rather than alien-
ated outsiders. If this is achieved, then employees will want to work enthusiastically 
towards the objectives of the organisation, irrespective of additional personal finan-
cial rewards, because they will intrinsically support the organisation’s mission. Iden-
tity is also related to the concept of reciprocity, in that people may be more willing 
to behave reciprocally towards those with whom they identify.
Behavioural economics can potentially be used to enrich policy discourse and 
development across the ideological continuum, and a number of policy frameworks 
have been developed over recent years to serve these ends.
3  Behavioural economic-informed policy frameworks
This section, with reference to social care policy, includes a discussion of how 
behavioural economics can inform three very different policy frameworks: namely, 
libertarian paternalism, coercive paternalism and behavioural regulation, otherwise 
respectively known as nudge, shove and budge approaches.
3.1  Libertarian paternalism
The most prominent attempts to apply behavioural economic phenomena to prac-
tical policy concerns have accepted the normative welfare economics tradition of 
utility maximisation. They are principally soft forms of paternalism. These include 
asymmetric paternalism, developed by Camerer et al. (2003), and libertarian pater-
nalism, formulated by Thaler and Sunstein (2003, 2008). These approaches are simi-
lar to each other in that they focus upon influencing the behaviour of the consumer 
and/or citizen, but libertarian paternalism has been much the more influential in 
policy circles and informs nudge interventions. Thaler and Sunstein use the term 
libertarian to modify the word paternalism in order to signify that their approach is 
liberty-preserving: those who wish to choose to continue with the same behaviours, 
either rationally or irrationally, after being exposed to a nudge intervention must be 
allowed to do so, and are thus not subject to any regulations or bans. The approach 
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is paternalistic in the sense that it aims to motivate behaviour change among those 
who, on reflection, would have liked to make different choices for themselves. This 
is key: nudge policies are not focussed upon changing behaviours so as to reduce 
harms posed to others, but rather to reduce self-imposed self-perceived harms to 
oneself. Thus, the focus is on reducing negative internalities. Negative internalities 
occur, according to the libertarian paternalists, because people make errors in their 
automatic choices, and can be ameliorated by altering the environment—the choice 
architecture—according to the findings of behavioural economics, so as to bring the 
instantaneous decisions of those who, on reflection, think that their non-reflective 
actions are irrational into better alignment with their deliberative preferences.
Libertarian paternalism rules out using significant financial incentives or overt 
persuasion to change behaviour, but rather, to reiterate, appeals to the cogni-
tive affects and processes that people employ when making automatic decisions. 
Therefore, although straightforward information campaigns are not, in themselves, 
nudges, behavioural economics can be used to frame the information in particular 
ways so that they might have more effect. The Dilnot Report (2011) on the future 
of social care funding in England proposed that the government should invest in 
a campaign so as to raise awareness of the personal responsibility borne by future 
social care costs; when designing such campaigns, it may be worthwhile to note that 
people unsurprisingly respond more to information that is vivid and salient than if 
it is abstract, to identifiable rather than statistical lives, and to stories rather than 
numbers.
Behavioural techniques designed to influence automatic decision making have of 
course been used by private sector interests for decades as a means to manipulate 
consumers into buying products. Libertarian paternalists advocate the use of similar 
tactics by public authorities to enhance welfare rather than increase profits. Insofar 
that nudges are meant to exploit unconscious decision making processes, they pre-
sumably have to be covert. Where they are covert (i.e. where the specific reason for 
their particular design is hidden), they may compromise liberty, and can legitimately 
be seen in this regard as strongly statist, particularly when one remembers that they 
tend to be targeted at internalities.
Thus, three core features of libertarian paternalism, each represented on an axis 
in Fig. 1, are that it addresses internalities rather than externalities, that it preserves 
liberty and is therefore antiregulatory, and that its applications are informed by 
behavioural economics rather than the standard model of rational choice.
Movements up the vertical axis in Fig. 1 indicate that an intervention adopts a 
more regulatory stance, movements along the horizontal axis indicate the extent to 
which the intervention is focussed upon addressing externalities rather than internal-
ities, and movements along the axis that is diagonally depicted show the degree to 
which the intervention is informed by rational choice theory. Nudge policies should 
cluster around the origin, such as the hypothetical policy box 1 in the Figure, which 
indicates that the intervention would preserve liberty, be informed by behavioural 
economics, and be focussed on addressing negative internalities. An example of 
such an intervention might be to place apples rather than chocolate bars at supermar-
ket checkout counters—in such circumstances a shopper is not required to buy the 
apples but might, on reflection, prefer to buy an apple rather than a chocolate bar, 
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and is more likely to now buy an apple because the presence of the apple near to the 
checkout has invaded his immediate and automatic decision making mental appara-
tus. These kinds of ideas might therefore be used to inform to good effect healthier 
eating and more active lifestyles in care homes. As earlier mentioned, the immediate 
displeasure experienced when exercising is, due to present bias, a probable reason 
why many people engage insufficiently in these types of activity; concerted efforts 
to make exercise more enjoyable for the elderly may often counteract the immediate 
discomfort, and, if voluntary and if they serve to trigger automatically behaviours 
that the participants wish to engage in for their own good, would qualify as nudges 
(e.g. dance classes for older people).
Although potentially having some positive effects, simple manipulations of the 
demand side that make healthier eating and exercise more accessible and enjoya-
ble, although rarely linked in the popular imagination to behavioural economics, are 
hardly original, and are unlikely to address more profound social care challenges 
such as the general reluctance to save towards possible future social care costs. In 
other areas of policy, changes to what is known as the default position have been 
shown to have a substantial impact on what people do. This relies on the human 
behavioural tendency of being very good at not doing anything, such that if the posi-
tion where people start is altered, it can have a strong effect on where they end up. 
For example, a far higher percentage of the adult population are registered as organ 
donors in countries where one has to opt out of being a donor than those where 
ExternalitiesInternalities
Regulatory
Liberty
Behavioural
Rational
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1
Fig. 1  The libertarian paternalism space
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one has to opt in, and more people contribute to pension plans where companies 
automatically enrol their employees compared to companies where employees are 
required to opt in to a plan (see, for example, Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
It might prove fruitful for social care policy makers to consider this behavioural 
phenomenon. For instance, might it be possible to default people into a social care 
tax, subject to a minimum income threshold? People could choose to opt out of the 
tax if they wish to forgo public financial support for future social care needs except 
in extreme circumstances, with the tax, in essence, securing entitlement to a prede-
fined social care benefit package. If people are subjected to an opt out system, the 
loss of coverage rather than the payment of the tax may appear to be the predomi-
nant loss, serving to steer them, through feelings of loss aversion, to accept the sta-
tus quo (psychological intuition suggests that money given up regularly in the form 
of, say, tax payments or insurance premiums in budgeted purchases may not actually 
be perceived as losses at all—see Kahneman and Tversky 1984). If the default tax 
on existing income still proved too off-putting for most people, it might be possible 
to apply ideas from Thaler and Benartzi’s (2004) Save More Tomorrow programme 
where, in order to increase savings for retirement, people are defaulted into pen-
sion schemes whereby they pre-commit to allocating a portion of their future sal-
ary increases to retirement savings. Arguably, a default tax for social care would 
retain autonomy, is informed by behavioural economic theory, and, assuming that 
those who do not opt out experience improvements in their own lifetime welfare, 
would satisfy the internality argument in libertarian paternalism, while also reduc-
ing at least to some degree the negative externality that current populations impose 
on future populations through insufficient savings for social care needs. The inter-
vention would at least be nudge-like, and is depicted by box 2 in Fig. 1.
The initial reaction of some people towards the idea of a default tax may not be 
auspicious; they might contend that it would be politically and individually unaccep-
table, and ineffective. At least some of these questions are empirical, and it is not the 
purpose of this article to answer them. Rather, in this section it is to offer a possible 
solution to the insufficient financing of social care according to the tenets of liber-
tarian paternalism, whereby people must be allowed to avoid the tax, and the tax 
must be designed such that it is informed by behavioural economics. Other aspects 
of behavioural economics could potentially be used to strengthen people’s accept-
ance of a voluntary social care tax. For example, since people tend to overweight 
small probabilities, they may enjoy the immediate thrill of participating in a lottery. 
It might therefore merit consideration to include a significant lottery prize compo-
nent into the design of the default tax, creating an affective tax by exploiting prob-
ability transformation and present bias. Although perhaps sounding like the ultimate 
oxymoron, designing an enjoyable tax, or at least attempting to include enjoyable 
components alongside tax participation, is an idea that perhaps should not be dis-
missed lightly.
Appealing to notions of reciprocity might also make a new tax more accepta-
ble; that is, if people are informed that although others are principally benefiting 
from these taxes now, they may benefit from both their own payments and from the 
payments of others in the future. Reciprocity considerations may also play a key 
role in whether a Japanese innovation, the fureai kippu (mentioned by the United 
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Kingdom’s Behavioural Insights Team 2010), can be successfully implemented in 
the English context. This intervention allows people to voluntarily gain hours, in the 
form of tickets, for helping elderly people with relatively simple tasks, such as shop-
ping, cleaning and companionship. The tickets are then exchangeable for help for the 
volunteers themselves when they grow old, or help from other volunteers for elderly 
relatives who live far away. The fureai kippu, in being voluntary for both the helpers 
and the helped, preserve liberty, and are in part informed by behavioural economics 
insofar as the helpers are seemingly responding to reciprocity rather than pure altru-
ism or self-interest, although the latter two motivations may also be present to some 
degree. The reciprocal nature of the intervention also suggests that both internal-
ity and externality considerations are at work—those engaged want to improve the 
welfare of others and in many cases presumably sacrifice valuable time in order to 
do so, but nonetheless wish for some ultimate improvements in their own welfare, 
via a caring utility and future help given to themselves and their loved ones as a 
consequence of their actions. The fureai kippu thus appear to entail some nudge-like 
features, and is represented by box 3 in Fig. 1.
Libertarian paternalists are means paternalists: they wish to steer people towards 
doing what the people themselves judge to be best for their wellbeing, without forc-
ing anyone to do anything. There is a stronger form of paternalism—ends paternal-
ism—that pays less respect to the element of choice. The foremost recent exposition 
of ends paternalism, Conly’s (2013) Against Autonomy, is, like libertarian paternal-
ism, motivated at least in part by behavioural economics.
3.2  Coercive paternalism
To reiterate, then, Conly (2013) has the same basic justification as the soft paternal-
ists for wanting to effect behaviour change in that she believes that the behavioural 
economic affects can cause errors that we should want to correct for the good of 
those making them. However, by retaining autonomy of choice, she believes that 
libertarian paternalistic interventions will be insufficiently effective. The libertar-
ian paternalists, for their part, do not tend to believe that all behavioural economic-
informed behaviours are necessarily mistakes; for example, Sunstein (2013a), in 
a review of Conly’s book, argues that with respect to present bias, our short-term 
goals might be a large part of what makes life worth living. Nonetheless, Conly 
advocates for the explicit regulation of citizens’ behaviours where the broadly con-
sidered benefits of the regulation are perceived to outweigh the broadly perceived 
costs. For example, Conly proposes a ban on smoking. Coercive paternalistic meas-
ures are sometimes referred to as shoves.
As with libertarian paternalism, the basic tenets of coercive paternalism can be 
represented in a three dimensional space; this is done in Fig. 2, where the liberty 
to regulatory axis of Fig. 1 is inverted to depict that a shove is more forceful than a 
nudge. In Fig. 2, shoves cluster around the origin.
Conly states that legislation should not control most aspects of life, but main-
tains that it is necessary when people are likely to make decisions that seriously and 
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irrevocably interfere with their ability to reach their lifetime goals, which she defines 
as health and financial security. It is clear, then, that she wants to forcibly constrain 
certain activities, but maintains that some behaviours, such as cigarette addiction 
and those related to obesity and insufficient retirement savings, are themselves lib-
erty inhibiting if one’s lifetime goals are compromised as a consequence.
Conly’s arguments are heavily motivated by the desire to counter present bias. If 
insufficient saving for future social care needs is driven by present bias, an obvious 
coercive paternalistic measure would be a mandatory social care tax, subject to a 
minimum income threshold. A mandatory social care tax, like a default tax, would 
presumably address to some degree negative internalities and negative externalities, 
and is not, therefore, a purely coercive paternalistic measure, but it is motivated by 
the presence of present bias and does therefore have definite shove-like qualities. A 
mandatory tax, unlike a default tax, would have the added benefit of guaranteeing 
an adequate risk spread, and would not be dissimilar in motivation to social security 
contributions to qualify for a state pension (or, in the United States, sufficient pay-
roll tax contributions to qualify for Medicare), although the probability of needing 
social care is lower. The behavioural economic affects could also be used to try to 
lessen resistance to a new mandatory tax, in ways similar to those earlier suggested 
in relation to a default tax. The mandatory social care tax is represented by the box 
in Fig. 2.
ExternalitiesInternalities
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Regulatory
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The Dilnot Report (2011) proposed the idea of deferred payments for social care, 
such that local authorities agree to pay for a person’s care in advance if individuals 
cannot do so without selling their house, on the agreement that the money will be 
recouped when their house is sold. An extension of this idea is an inheritance tax 
for social care, where, in line with the Dilnot Report, people agree in advance for 
their estate after their death to either cover the entire future costs of any social care 
they require, or that a fixed percentage of their estate be allocated to a social care 
fund irrespective of whether they themselves need social care in the future. A pre-
commitment of this kind may ameliorate resistance towards paying in the present for 
distant indeterminate benefits.
Behavioural economics is not confined to the realms of soft and hard paternalism, 
however. It can also be used to inform where and how to regulate against negative 
externalities.
3.3  Regulating against harms
Regulating against harms to others but not to address internalities, following Mill 
(1869), is known as the harm principle. Neither libertarian paternalists nor coercive 
paternalists rule out regulations against harms to others: Sunstein (2013b) advocates 
for more simple government regulation that is informed by behavioural economics 
and thus contends that the argument should not be about more or less regulation 
but rather better regulation, and Conly (2013) believes regulating against harms is 
non-contentious. Rather than adopt a paternalistic approach, some have argued that 
it may be more appropriate and effective to use behavioural economics to inform 
explicit regulation against harms imposed by the supply side. Interventions informed 
by this approach have been called budges (Oliver 2013).
Like nudges and shoves, the fundamental requirements of budge policy can be 
depicted in a three dimensional space. Figure  3 replicates Fig.  2, except that the 
internalities to externalities axis has been inverted. The design of the regulation 
would not necessarily be informed by behavioural economics in the way that the 
design of nudges are meant to be informed as such; in budge policy, knowledge of 
the behavioural economic findings is required in order to detect when private sector 
interests are using them for their own, sometimes objectionable, ends. That said, the 
design of the regulation itself can also be informed by behavioural economics so as 
to attempt to strengthen its effect. Classic budges are regulations against harmful, 
behavioural economic-informed supply side activities, and will cluster around the 
origin in Fig. 3.
In relation to social care, budge policy would appear to be most relevant when 
considering the activities of the formal care providers, the local authority funders 
and, if a private market were to emerge, private social care insurers. Interestingly, 
some budge-like suggestions and developments have already been proposed and ini-
tiated in England. For instance, The Dilnot Report (2011) called for all information 
regarding the provision of social care on the national level to be placed on a new 
single website. When one remembers that people suffer from bounded rationality 
and rapid cognitive overload, it ought to be kept in mind that for such a website to be 
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useful, particularly to users and carers who may be harried, old, frail and sometimes 
confused, access to and the design of the website should be as clear and simple to 
use as possible. In order to try to motivate better performance from the providers, 
and indeed the local authorities, the principles of behavioural economics can in this 
instance be used to inform the design of the budge intervention. For example, the 
providers could be clearly ranked annually on the website against each other accord-
ing to their performance, with a salient reference point emphasised to demarcate 
what may be considered as good or bad relative performance. Alternatively, each 
provider could be awarded a simple indicator of overall performance, in a manner 
similar to the star rating system for English National Health Service (NHS) hospi-
tals that operated in the first decade of this century, where zero to three stars were 
awarded for bad to good performance and where the performance of each hospital 
was widely, openly disseminated, which partly contributed to a substantial reduc-
tion in NHS waiting times (e.g. Oliver 2012). The key, according to the findings of 
behavioural economics, is to create a clear reference point so that the providers (and 
users) perceive that performance lower than the reference point is, in some sense, a 
loss. Thus, due to loss aversion, each provider may be particularly motivated to try 
to avoid these perceptions being attached to their own organisation.
Creating a league table or metric of performance requires indicators of outcome. 
Simple indicators appertaining to each provider and local authority could include 
the visible reporting of what they each charge and cover, which may to some extent 
InternalitiesExternalities
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serve to motivate national standardisation, but clearly it is important that the cho-
sen simple metrics represent genuine potential improvements in service quality. This 
is one reason why it is important to involve users, carers, providers and funders in 
the development of the metrics. Another reason to involve service staff is to offer 
them some ownership over the process, to enable them to identify with the policy 
intervention. The open publication of relative performance does have the potential to 
demoralise at least some of the staff who work in the system, and therefore to coun-
ter this it is perhaps advisable to attempt to maximise their engagement with the 
intervention’s processes and objectives. Since 2013, the Local Government Associa-
tion in England has taken some steps towards the public reporting of performance 
by publishing adult care performance data for all local authorities. However, in order 
for this intervention to fulfil its potential it is likely that the metrics used need to be 
simpler and more visible, for users and providers. In general, though, this policy 
intervention is informed by behavioural economic phenomena, and attempts to ame-
liorate harms and improve benefits. If local authorities and providers are regulated 
so that they have to provide the data required, the intervention encapsulates what is 
meant by a budge, and is represented by the box in Fig. 3.
4  Conclusion
In this article, I have described some of the behavioural economic phenomena 
and have presented indicative examples of how these may be used in social care 
through the lens of several policy frameworks. The behavioural affects have com-
plex potential consequences, and though one might prove beneficial, another might 
prove harmful. For example, creating a clear reference point for good performance 
might, via notions of reference points and loss aversion, be expected to have desir-
able effects, but if care is not taken, the same instrument could undermine employ-
ees’ identity with the organisations within which they work, which is likely to have 
negative consequences for service users.
Ideological convictions will drive which policy interventions one finds accept-
able. If we wish to try to improve the performance of local authorities and care 
providers but prefer to not interfere in decisions that are principally focused upon 
internalities, we should perhaps restrict ourselves to budges. If attempts to reduce 
negative internalities are considered allowable but not enforceable, then soft pater-
nalism offers possibilities; enforceability points towards coercive paternalism. Or we 
can embrace a mix of these policy frameworks. The beauty of behavioural econom-
ics is that it underpins all of them.
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